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## STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

### THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE: A RELEVANT FORCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

BY

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by

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## ABSTRACT

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The United States Army continues to experience end strength reductions based on the recommendations of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR). The impact of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have critical implications for the future military size, force structure, force mix, and the U.S. National Military Strategies for the Twenty-First Century. The relevancy of the United States Army Reserve must not be underestimated during the QDR evaluation. This paper examines mobilizations of the United States Army Reserve beginning with World War II to present, recent reorganizations, and improvements for efficiencies in training and readiness. The Total Force Policy adopted in 1973 was favorably demonstrated during the Gulf War and continues to be evident in present Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).



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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

Reality for national strategists in the 21st Century demands active United States Army Reserve (USAR) participation in any military contingency. Since 1989 the Active Component (AC) end strength has decreased 34%, from 751,000 to 495,000, requiring adjustments in military strategy. During this period the Army conversely experienced a dramatic increased operational tempo (OPTEMO) as missions became more frequent and regionalized. Simultaneously, the Reserve Component (RC) also experienced personnel reductions, increased OPTEMO, and shifting of missions to strengthen support to the AC in combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) roles. These influences required a dramatic shift from AC rhetoric to practice in accepting the RC as a full and integral component of national defense.

The 1989 Cold War National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS), became outdated with the Soviet Union's disintegration. The national strategy evolved from massive retaliation, to deterrence and containment, to one of engagement and enlargement. Despite



the absence of a peer military power, a new strategy has been developed that envisions the United States (U.S.) facing two (nearly simultaneous) major regional contingencies (MRC).

In August 1990, immediately following the Soviet Union's collapse, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq forced the U.S. to reevaluate many aspects of political, economic and military strategies. Furthermore, the 1973 Total Force Policy initiated by General Creighton Abrams was finally tested in combat and proved to be, argumentatively, an effective, necessary strategy. This policy realigned the majority of CS and CSS force structure to the RC, thus, at that time, protecting the AC warfighting structure from reductions. Consequently, this policy elevated some USAR units to early deployers and made them essential in providing various types of support units to the warfight. The Total Force Policy, strengthened by the downsizing strategies of the early 1990's, proved successful with the Gulf War RC mobilization.

Post-Desert Storm, a reinvigorated, historical Congressional debate ensued regarding the proper size and force mix of the military. Historically, similar debates have occurred after each major conflict. Periodically, the



President and Congress questions the cost and necessity for a large standing army in desiring to reduce the national debt or transfer resources to domestic programs. This so called "peace dividend", causes a resurgence in reviewing military strategy, structure and missions of all military services. Realistically, domestic economics overshadowed the military requirements after the Gulf War.

In March 1993, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Bottom-Up Review (BUR). Its charter was to conduct an in-depth review of the military and make recommendations to include "strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial bases, and infrastructure" of the future force.<sup>1</sup> Many would suggest the BUR was a politically driven appraisal, specifically targeting the reduction of force structure for economic goals. Today, the debate continues regarding the military's ability to fight and win the two MRC scenario with the reduced force structure. Regardless, the BUR recommendations shaped end strength reductions.

In October 1993, the Active Army and Reserve Component Senior Leaders Offsite Agreement set a stabilized RC end strength of 575,000 (367K Army National Guard (ARNG); 208K USAR) through FY 1999. The Offsite participants agreed that



the USAR core competency would be CS and CSS echelons above Corps, while the ARNG competency would be combat arms. However, the ARNG would still maintain some support organizations at Division level.<sup>2</sup> This was a critical debate and decision as it specified the Army RC mobilization focus towards the warfight. Shifting a predominance of CS and CSS assets to the USAR increased AC reliance on the USAR for any contingency.

Assuredly, the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will debate issues similar to the 1993 BUR. Speculation exists that the QDR may recommend an AC end strength reduction to below 475,000 compensating for early 21st century modernization programs. Further AC reduction equals increased RC reliance, as evidenced in recent Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in Haiti and Bosnia.

The USAR evolution began with its establishment in the early 20th Century and continues aggressively today. This paper examines the challenges the RC met in becoming a true partner in America's defense, the various mobilizations and lessons learned since World War II, the failure to initiate corrective actions to problems, present approaches to USAR and AC integration, and conclusions.



## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The present mobilization strategies result from lessons learned in every conflict since the Revolutionary War. From the early stages of the Cold War through the Gulf War, a large standing army dominated the NMS, augmented, if necessary, by the RC. However, two major conflicts, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, shaped the majority of today's mobilization policies. Strategic political, economic, and geographical realities from these conflicts provide the motivation for strategy revision

#### ***World War II:***

During the 1920-1930's, U.S. isolationism produced limited defense budgets by Congress. The absence of adequate levels of funding or popular support not only allowed minimum manning, training, or equipping of active military but even less for the Organized Reserves. At the beginning of World War II there were only 150,000 reserve officers in all services.<sup>3</sup>



American isolationism diminished with the anticipated U.S. entrance into World War II. On 8 September 1939, as war became inevitable, President Roosevelt declared a "limited national emergency." This began the military build-up of manpower in the army, the Army National Guard, and further expanded the active duty officer force with the Reserve Officer Corps. The Reserves gained indispensable time for pre-mobilization training and war preparation because of President Roosevelt's early anticipation of war. The traditional method of calling untrained citizens to support national defense became a secondary method of expanding the military.<sup>4</sup>

Major delays in force deployments occurred despite the pre-war RC preparation due to lack of reserve force training, transportation and equipment. The Reserves could not overcome the years of fiscal and managerial neglect in a relatively short timeframe.<sup>5</sup>

Mobilization planners of this era did not or could not envision the gradual build up of forces to meet a national emergency. Relying on historical precedence, planners presumed mobilization would be immediate and Total, not a mobilization consisting of the phasing of forces. The



gradual mobilization of reservists proved successful and became the policy in later legislation.<sup>6</sup>

***Post World War II:***

The U.S. evolved from isolationism to a world leader and accepted inherent global responsibility following the victory in World War II. The Soviet Union emerged as the new major threat to democracy in the view of the allied nations. The U.S. was war weary, encouraged revived Congressional debate concerning the necessity for a large peacetime army. Congress and the public wanted a rapid demobilization of forces. Hence, the ability to rapidly mobilize a ready Reserve, supporting the NSS and the NMS, against the Soviet threat became a vital interest.<sup>7</sup>

General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, recognized the demonstrated advantage to a strong, viable reserve force. He called on General John McAuley Palmer (Retired), a proponent of a viable army reserve, to chair a new committee chartered to define the future citizen-Army framework.<sup>8</sup>

The War Department Circular 347 dated 24 August 1944, a Palmer committee product, required continual development of



reserve forces. The circular stated the "professional peace establishment" should be "no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements." The regular forces would be supported by a "properly organized citizen army reserve."<sup>9</sup>

In the following years, rhetorical support for an Organized Reserve was absent of prerequisite funding for training and equipping. Congressional neglect in providing resources reduced the Reserves mobilization preparation and weakened the partnership with the Regular forces. Neglect of the most elementary management systems to track the location of reservists, civilian skills, or individual physical condition continued.<sup>10</sup>

#### **Korean War:**

President Truman's fiscal appropriations supporting a strong reserve after World War II failed to win Congressional approval. Instead, national strategies continued to rely on the Selective Service as an alternative. Therefore, a trained, ready Reserve did not exist to assist the active forces in deterring the North Korean aggression.<sup>11</sup>



When North Korea invaded South Korea on 15 June 1950, the national strategy of Soviet "containment" transitioned to a "limited war." Within one week of North Korea's invasion, Congress authorized President Truman to call up the Reserves and to use the Selective Service to obtain draftees. In June 1950, the Organized Reserve unit authorizations at full strength included 146,000 officers and 956,000 enlisted soldiers. However, the 1951 Congressional budget limited the units to 73,500 officers and 181,500 soldiers. Figures indicated numerous combat and service support units manned at 25% or less of authorized strength levels.<sup>12</sup> During the first year of the Korean War the mobilization of approximately 630,000 reservists occurred.<sup>13</sup>

Neglect of the Reserves and mobilization planning since the end of World War II was evident. It was an Organized Reserve Corps in name only. The regular force expansion by the Reserves during the Korean War was, at best, an ad hoc demonstration of national necessity versus strategy supported by proper planning.

Some Korean War issues that caused distress included lack of early Presidential involuntary call-up authority of the Organized Reserves, little planning for levels of



mobilization (limited versus Full), absence of time phasing of arrivals at the mobilization stations, lack of post-mobilization unit and individual training, ambiguous personnel and personnel replacement policies, inexperience of administrative and supply personnel, and no plans for demobilization.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, the Reserves received credit from the political and military leadership for being a deciding military factor in the Korean War.

#### **Post Korea War:**

The Korean War mobilization lessons forced a revitalization of interest in a strong, ready reserve and the mobilization process. The decade of the 1950's combined Congressional legislation and appropriations, political lobbyists (National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) and the Reserve Officers Association (ROA)), and public interest, to become the most productive period in RC history. The errors in mobilization and preparation in meeting a conventional threat, relying instead on massive nuclear retaliation, demanded a NMS review and revision, including RC roles.

The Reserves political strength directly influenced the 1950's legislation and budgets. The executive branch and



the DOD failed to recognize this strong influence and consequently, this created conflict with the legislative branch. Many members of Congress were veterans and/or Reserve members, providing influential support previously unavailable to the Reserves. The NGAUS and the ROA became very powerful organizations lobbying for improvements in the Reserves.<sup>15</sup>

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 became the first Congressional legislation that provided an all encompassing collection of Reserve policies and definitions. It specifically defined the various USAR categories still used today.<sup>16</sup> A USAR category description is provided in Appendix A.<sup>17</sup>

The Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 established the reserve officer promotion criteria and career development path. The act provided, for the first time, a standardization of reserve promotion policies similar to the active forces. The 1954 act resulted directly from identified promotion and career progression inequities between the regular forces and reserve soldiers activated during the Korean War.<sup>18</sup>



The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 classified the service obligations of individuals to serve in the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. This act was a major policy statement resolving the confusion surrounding the sequencing of the Korean War call-up of reserve soldiers.<sup>19</sup> A definition of levels of access to the Reserves is located at Appendix B.<sup>20</sup>

President Eisenhower's NSS strategy vision of nuclear, massive retaliation against the Soviets influenced his administration to opt for increased numbers of missiles over appropriations for conventional forces. He recommended budget reductions of 10% in the Reserve Paid End Strength in his final three budget submissions as one method to counterbalance the cost of missiles. However, President Eisenhower failed to recognize Congressional support for a strong ready reserve that overshadowed his fiscal concerns. Additionally, he failed to perceive the NGAUS and ROA political strength. Instead of a budget reduction, Congress established for the first time, RC End Strength levels, in appropriations to assure stability. Therefore, nuclear deterrence, at the expense of the AC and RC conventional forces, failed.<sup>21</sup>



### **Berlin Crisis:**

President Kennedy's strategy of flexible deterrence, instead of massive retaliation, was a major issue in his campaign for election. Upon election, he increased the defense budget by \$237M to expand conventional forces. Furthermore, he directed an AC/RC military realignment of forces to enhance readiness and responsiveness.<sup>22</sup>

In 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev tested U.S. prestige as a world power by pressuring the Western allies to make Berlin a "free city." The western sector of Berlin was under French, British and U.S. control and thus, seen as a democratic threat to the Soviets. Refugees fleeing East Germany sought safety in Berlin and this became a sensitive issue with the Soviets. Khrushchev stated to Kennedy that the settlement of the Berlin issue would occur regardless of U.S. involvement. The president viewed this as an indication the Soviet Union would use military force to achieve its goal.<sup>23</sup>

Between June 1961 and June 1962, President Kennedy mobilized approximately 60,000 USAR soldiers for this crisis. Interestingly, the RC mobilization signaled a strong message of U.S. resolve to the Soviet Union. The RC mobilization became a political instrument of deterrence and



national strategy. President Kennedy described his decision to call up the RC as "not to win a war, but to help prevent a war."<sup>24</sup>

However, the mobilization problems of the Berlin Crisis were similar to those of previous RC call-ups. These included low levels of readiness of mobilized units, personnel shortages in units, lack of RC equipment, limited planning contingencies for a partial mobilization, RC peacetime management in mobilization preparation and demobilization.<sup>25</sup>

A chartered Congressional subcommittee, chaired by Representative F. Edward Herbert, reviewed the status of reserve forces. Constant, RC historical deficiencies continued to surface (lack of equipment, training, and manpower). The committee criticized the army for neglecting management of Reserve policy programs and for allowing them to "rock and stumble without any imaginative or aggressive effort to resolve them." However, the major congressional concern directly involved a Korean War issue presumably corrected. "Military departments had not prepared contingency plans that contemplated a partial mobilization



and hence were unable to properly select units for recall."<sup>26</sup>

In his 1962 Annual Report, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara addressed the noted deficiencies. He promised to correct the RC readiness levels, ensure planning for all levels of mobilization and requested additional appropriations supporting these areas in 1962 and 1963.<sup>27</sup>

The Berlin Crisis RC call-up lacked the drama of the Korean War mobilization, but met the strategic goals of President Kennedy. Additionally, it prompted yet another review of RC mobilization policies and readiness at a time when the stated national strategy was deterrence using conventional forces. Most importantly, the RC demonstration as a key element of the deterrence strategy began to emerge.

#### **Vietnam:**

Ironically, the message President Kennedy sent by mobilizing the RC was the same rationale his successor, President Johnson, used in not mobilizing them early in the Vietnam War. President Johnson stated in his memoirs that "we would not make threatening moves to the Chinese or Russians by calling up the RC in large numbers."<sup>28</sup>



Increasingly, the RC demonstrated they were emerging as a political instrument of national strategy.

The military leadership repeatedly asked President Johnson to activate Reserve forces for the Vietnam War. The military leaders viewed his decision not to use these pre-trained assets as a political decision that negatively effected the conduct of the war. Additionally, these leaders believed RC mobilization would involve and garner the American national and populous support. General Maxwell D. Taylor wrote about his frustration regarding the decision not to mobilize the Reserves in Korea and its lesson in the later conflict:

"The national behavior showed a tendency to premature war-weariness and precipitate disenchantment with a policy that had led to a stalemated war. This experience, if remembered, could have given some warning of dangers ahead to the makers of the subsequent Vietnam policy. Unfortunately, there was no thorough-going analysis ever made of the lessons to be learned from Korea, and later policy makers proceeded to repeat many of the same mistakes."<sup>29</sup>

In 1968, President Johnson mobilized approximately 20,500 reservists to meet the challenges of the North Vietnamese TET Offensive and the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, a navy spy ship. This action came after numerous requests from General William C. Westmoreland for an additional 206,000 soldiers in Vietnam. President



Johnson's final determination in limiting the mobilization to 70 RC units was financial according to an Army After Action Report (AAR). He believed the financial support required to meet General Westmoreland's request did not equal the need for the nations domestic programs.<sup>30</sup>

An evaluation of the RC mobilization in 1968 identified identical shortcomings associated with all previous mobilizations. These deficiencies included the lack of RC equipment and training, manning levels below the 100% level, no declaration of a national emergency for the call-up, non-MOS qualified Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) filler personnel, and complaints of "infusion" by units. Infusion was the practice of replacing USAR unit members with non-unit members, thus, compromising unit integrity and cohesion.<sup>31</sup>

The USAR recruiting slogan "Train with your buddies, serve with your buddies," became only that, a slogan.<sup>32</sup> Historically, key RC demonstrated strengths have been the development of unit cohesion, teamwork, esprit de corps, and trust. The implementation of "fusion" assured potential tragedies within one reserve unit did not affect an entire civilian community, but reduced some of the elements that made the RC strong.<sup>33</sup>



**Post Vietnam:**

The Vietnam military leadership analyzed the policy affects of not mobilizing the RC and decided to pursue revisions at the national level to avoid recurrence in future conflicts. General Abrams developed the Total Force Policy that stated a great reliance on the RC. Arguably the real intent was to tie the RC to any military conflict, thus, ensuring careful Congressional analysis consideration regarding the impact upon their constituents. Additionally, the policy provided community support for military operations by linking a vested interest in the conduct of a war, that is their family members, friends, neighbors, etc.,

In 1976, Congress revised and implemented changes to the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority. The revised provision allowed the mobilization of 50,000 Selected Reservists of all services for operational requirements for a limited period of time without having to declare a national emergency. In the early 1980's the maximum number increased to 200,000. This indicates an increasing reliance on the RC in the NSS and the NMS.<sup>34</sup>

The Total Force Policy shifted CS and CSS requirements and assets from the AC to the RC. Two key results of this policy were the linking the RC more directly to the warfight



and it allowed for an increase of AC divisions to sixteen, while maintaining a stable end strength.<sup>35</sup>

The CAPSTONE AC/RC affiliations and concept of "round out" brigades provided a basis for the AC divisional increase without an increase in end strength. In this concept, selected Active divisions would have two AC brigades, "rounded out" by one RC brigade. The reserve brigade joins its parent AC unit at the mobilization station, providing force structure expansion for the warfight. More peacetime divisional structure resulted while preserving end strength through rapid expansion upon mobilization. By the late 1980's, 52% of the combat forces belonged to the AC while 67% of the CS and CSS structure resided in the RC.<sup>36</sup>

#### **Gulf War:**

The Iraq invasion of Kuwait brought years of rhetoric and inaction about the RC to the point of the Total Army sword. President Bush and his military leaders realized that success in executing the war required RC mobilization. On 22 August 1990, he authorized the PSRC. Truly a total effort by the AC and RC the war's build up took many months



of preparation. Estimations indicate that 70% of the manpower required to build infrastructure to support the war effort came from the RC.<sup>37</sup>

On 18 January 1991, President Bush authorized partial mobilization of up to one million reservists, of all services, for a period of 24 months. Partial mobilization includes access to the IRR, the largest portion of the reserve manpower pool. By 1 February 1991, 90% of the 20,000 that received notification reported to designated mobilization stations. This nullified previous concern about the percentage of RC soldiers that would actually report.<sup>38</sup>

Successful RC mobilization and utilization during the Gulf War demonstrated the years of effort to fully integrate the AC and RC. The RC played a key role in logistical support as well as providing replacements in CONUS and in Germany for those deployed forces who filled essential functions. No one can argue the contribution the RC provided during the most aggressive military mobilization since the Korean War.



## CHAPTER THREE

### SOME IMPROVEMENTS AND RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS:

#### ACCESSIBILITY, READINESS, AND TRAINING

The AAR of every mobilization indicates several key areas of concerns regarding the RC to include accessibility, readiness, training, personnel, and equipment. Proper attention by the military (AC and RC) and the political branches of government could have resolved these deficiencies. Other areas that needed attentions include: revisions in laws to define and assure accessibility to the RC, increased monitoring of readiness levels and improved readiness through enhanced training, and increased equipment distribution.

Arguments exist that current cooperation, integration, and accountability in all components resulted from necessity caused directly by recent reductions in end strength and allocation of force structure. However, one must not forget the Total Army Policy's ideological foundation that integrated the AC and RC prepared the army for these austere times.



This chapter will address three areas of accountability and responsibility essential to support the current NSS and NMS: accessibility, readiness, and training.

#### **ACCESSIBILITY:**

Open, increased recognition for a strong USAR to meet the two MRC scenario challenges is emerging. Continued accessibility of the RC emerges as a major issue requiring continual review by the Executive and Legislative branches. There are several levels of mobilization: PSRC, Partial, Total and Full. Legislative limitations restrict the number of reservists that may be called up and the maximum time for each level of mobilization (Appendix B).

By the end of the Cold War, all war plans included mobilization considerations and RC Time Phased Force and Development List (TPFDLS). During this timeframe, regionalized threats and the two MRC scenario strategies evolved from a focus of global confrontation with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations.

In 1989, war plans or not, as the Pentagon planners contemplated RC mobilization to assist in Operation Just Cause (Panama). However, they failed to foresee Presidential approval of PSRC. The planners uncertainty of



President Bush's resolve in exercising his PSRC authority and involuntary accessibility prevented a RC accessibility test, in this instance. Instead, the planners sought the authority to solicit RC volunteers because of previous, positive experience with volunteer citizen-soldiers.<sup>39</sup>

Gulf War planners displayed the same uncertainty of RC accessibility. On 22 August 1990, President Bush quickly and dramatically exercised PSRC authority, surprising the war planners. They were even more surprised to learn he had approved this concept on 4 August 1990. Delayed mobilization and loss of valuable time resulted from the war planners concern over the accessibility of the RC. The PSRC was the first stage in a protracted build-up phase, luckily, absent of challenges to the coalition forces by Iraq.<sup>40</sup>

Since the Gulf War, President Clinton has exercised PSRC authority for Operation Promote Democracy (Haiti) in 1994 for 180 days and the continuing Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia) initiated in 1995. These examples demonstrated favorable, successful involuntary Selected Reserve accessibility.

Accessibility to the IRR, different from Selected Reserve accessibility, continues to be a concern. This



category of reservists augments AC and RC units as individual fillers or replacements upon mobilization. Partial Mobilization must be authorized before involuntary mobilization of the IRR may occur. Instead, if IRR personnel are required during PSRC and before Partial Mobilization, they must be solicited to volunteer.

One innovative option to assist in accessibility to the IRR is to solicit the IRR volunteers before an emergency. The focus of IRR volunteers would be the RT-12 through RT-24 population (Recently Trained within 12 to 24 months). By targeting this population of the IRR the soldiers with more recent doctrinal and hands on experience require less train-up time for mobilization. Once an IRR soldier volunteers, the expedited assignment to a Derivative Unit Identification Code (DUIC), as a member of a Selected Reserve unit, can result. This option is still under review at the DOD level.<sup>41</sup>

There are thousands of dedicated RC soldiers eager to volunteer to serve their country during times of national emergency. However, soliciting them to volunteer places the USAR soldier in a very precarious situation with their family and/or employer. From a soldiers' perspective involuntary call-up is more acceptable as this allows the



opportunity to protect employment rights and the peace and harmony in the family. Conversely, it is difficult to explain to a family how volunteering to be away for an extended time, in a potentially hostile environment, is necessary. It is even more difficult to explain to an employer that an absence is voluntary and to expect employment protection until the employee returns from active duty. Because of these reasons RC volunteers are reluctant to jeopardize their careers and other important aspects of their lives. The DOD should submit a request to change the law, granting volunteers the same protection under law as granted to those involuntarily called to active duty.

The present authorities and levels of mobilization have proved to provide adequate presidential power to involuntarily call-up citizen-soldiers in times of national emergency. Policy makers must continually review, revise, and adapt these authorities, allowing greater flexibility and responsiveness to the National Command Authority (NCA). They cannot assume that the policies used today will continue to meet the needs of the nation indefinitely. The policies based on the vision of yesterday's Cold War strategies, global conflict, do not necessarily meet the needs of regionalized conflicts and MOOTW.



**READINESS:**

The historical concern regarding USAR readiness result from areas addressed earlier. Not until the Total Force Policy began to shape the philosophies of both the AC and the USAR did readiness really become a topic of interest during peacetime, as well as wartime. Several obstacles in preventing the USAR from acquiring an acceptable level of readiness include: neglect during peacetime, lack of sufficient appropriations by Congress, absence of professional development courses, lack of training facilities, and lack of equipment.

In October 1992, the activation of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) provided, for the first time, a direct unit USAR chain of command. Previously, the AC controlled the flow of resources (funding and equipment) and day-to-day USAR operations received minimal attention. The USARC's centralized chain of command provides direct USAR oversight responsibility, streamlining the identification and resolution of problem areas.

The USARC continues to improve efficiencies and readiness even while undergoing a reorganization from 20 Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) to 10 Regional Support Commands (RSC), in FY 95. This reorganization reduced



command structures and associated management layering in the USAR. The reduction of commands allowed for realignment of force structure during the continuing drawdown period. It is important to realize here that the USAR's end strength is being reduced by 35% from 1989 levels, based on the BUR recommendations. This is a larger percentage than any other component of any service.<sup>42</sup>

In 1994 the USAR instituted a tiered resourcing model to improve readiness and administer reducing resources. Tiered resourcing provides the basis for distribution of resources to USAR units according to a mobilization priority system; the higher the priority the higher the allocation of resources, up to 100%. From June 1994 through May 1996, the readiness ratings of Force Support Package (FSP) high priority units, the primary USAR deploying units, improved by 22%. During this period, between 68% and 71% of all USAR units were rated as ready to go to war, despite having the lowest level of Full Time Support (FTS) of any Reserve Component.<sup>43</sup>

Tiered resourcing, while improving USAR go-to-war unit readiness is an evolving concept that requires monitoring. One issue that surfaced in recent MOOTW operations is that USAR units being mobilized occur outside the Force Support



Package; mobilization of lower priority units frequently occurs over higher priority units. Why? Because war planners are reluctant to mobilize RC units designated in the two MRC TPFDL for MOOTW operations, thus, ensuring their availability for major conflicts. As MOOTW operations become more frequent, the basic philosophy and effectiveness of Tiered Resourcing become less clear.

On 16 October 1996, the USARC activated the USAR Readiness Command to improve readiness monitoring and focus specific attention to the readiness of USAR FSP and CONUS-based support units. The mission of the USAR Readiness Command is to "ensure high-priority units are properly resourced, trained and ready to deploy in support of the tactical and strategic needs of the nation."<sup>44</sup> The USAR Readiness Command will have ten regionally placed teams of four personnel each to assist units in the FSP.

Readiness of USAR units is a primary concern from the NCA down to the unit commander. More frequent, regionalized, conflicts of shorter duration are becoming the norm. To support the NSS and NMS, the USAR must provide ready, trained units to all contingencies. As an example, Civil Affairs (CA) units are an essential type of unit for



MOOTW involvement; approximately 97% of all CA units reside in the USAR.

**TRAINING:**

Historically, impediments to USAR training include lack of funding, limited training facilities, low interest, motivation, time and neglect. Frequently, political decisions prevent resourcing and timely, substantial training improvements. Recent attitudinal changes, increased emphasis on readiness and training, and the RC successes in the Gulf War indicate a desire to overcome deficiencies. Additionally, the USAR continues to seek aggressive training enhancements and development as a strong integral component of the Total Army. A discussion of USAR training and readiness innovations conclude the remainder of this chapter.

Recently, the USAR converted its core training division structure into two distinct organizations: Division (Institutional Training) (DIV (IT)) and Training Division (Exercise) (DIV (EX)). This reorganization supports the national strategy of Partial Mobilization planning as it affects pre-mobilization training and changes in training



requirements. The organizational changes allow for collective unit and individual training in preparation for deployment, enhances efficiencies, reduces C2 overhead, and increases readiness.<sup>45</sup>

DIVIT structure aligns with the seven regions associated with the Total Army Schools System (TASS) and focuses on individual training. The DIVIT mission is to "provide training such as Initial Entry Training, Military Occupational Specialty and Professional Development courses for all three components of the Army." The USAR Forces (USARF) schools, previously under ARCOM control, aligned functionally with this reorganization. The DIVITs centrally manage individual training in a geographic area for Troop Program Unit (TPU) members and refresher training for IRR members.<sup>46</sup>

The Training Division (EX) mission is to "provide standardized LANES exercises and simulation training to the Reserve Component." The Total Army Training Study (TATS) eliminated differences in tasks and standards between AC and reserve component training. The DIV EX supports the TATS by training to standard the Reserve Component "chemical and engineer units, conducts command



post exercises, field training exercises and assists the AC with unit validation during mobilization."<sup>47</sup>

A new initiative being developed by the USAR in conjunction with the AC is the Reserve Associate Support Program (RASP). The RASP provides increased training for drilling reservists, while in a training status, and at the same time assists the Army in meeting high priority CS and CSS personnel requirements. This plan allows between 2,000 and 4,000 USAR soldiers to spend 24 months on active duty. This period includes initial entry training (IET), attached for training to an AC unit while still assigned to high priority reserve units. The RASP Program participants return to USAR high priority units as a trained, qualified, successful soldier with extensive hands-on experience. This program enhances interoperability and integration of AC and RC units.<sup>48</sup>

In an era of limited resources, another option for improving USAR training capabilities is a new concept using new technologies of the information management area called "distance learning." Distance learning provides USAR soldiers with Internet access or dial-in access to a USAR facility the opportunity to train at a remote site,



thus, saving travel time and expenses. Distance learning, although not totally appropriate for all fields (e.g., those requiring hands on experience) may provide valuable preparatory lessons for many skills. The USAR must capitalize on the innovations that the world of Information Management and automation provides.



CHAPTER FOUR  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**CONCLUSIONS:**

The USAR's elevated relevance and importance to the NMS requires increased acknowledgment. The leverage offered by the USAR supplies a force multiplier in every contingency. Regionalized conflicts and missions, demanding greater integration and USAR support roles have replaced the global conflict envisioned during the Cold War era. An example of this increased participation includes USAR involvement in MOOTW missions. Numerous evolving strategic, political, and military concerns contribute to the increased role of the RC in exercising the dynamic NSS and NMS.

Senior military and political leadership quickly acknowledge the USAR's importance in the NSS and the NMS success in recent publications, interviews, and open forums. Evidently, everyone realizes the reduction of AC end strength with increased OPTEMPO requires an RC augmentation. As the DOD continues the QDR, discussions will focus on the military capabilities of meeting the two MRC requirements. Debate surrounding the right AC and RC force mix continues to emerge as an essential QDR issue.



Steadfast preservation of the Selected Reserve end strength of 208,000 or above, to fully support the NCA strategies, equals the importance of supporting the AC's end strength at 495,000. The NCA, Congress, and the American public expect a capable military in achieving the U.S. global strategic goals. Continued military end strength reductions and relative capabilities weaken the U.S. international posture as a world leader.

How relevant is the USAR to the warfight, now and in the 21st Century? "The Army Reserve mobilized 78,777 soldiers for Operation Desert Storm. This represented thirty-five percent (35%) of the total US Reserve Component force commitment to the Desert War. The Army Reserve represented seventy percent (70%) of the Reserve Component commitment for Operation Uphold Democracy. More than 1,000 Army Reservists with 17 units served in Haiti. The USAR has represented sixty-eight percent (68%) of the reserve commitment to Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia. The ratio of recent Army Reserve MOOTW participation far exceeds the participation ratio of any other service's reserve component."<sup>49</sup> The USAR's relevance and commitment to the



protection of U.S. vital interests and national strategies shape its role in the Army of the 21st Century.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

In summary, the following recommendations relate directly to the historic problems in mobilization discussed in Chapter 3, accessibility, readiness, training, personnel and equipment.

Accessibility of the IRR under PSRC authority warrants review and legislative revision. The IRR manpower pool remains a valuable source of pre-trained USAR soldiers. However, present law does not address involuntary mobilization of the IRR until authorization of Partial Mobilization. Additionally, present law fails to provide employment protection for IRR volunteers even for a national emergency.

Demonstrated Selected Reserve accessibility must not become an incentive to mobilize RC. Caution must accompany availability to ensure the RC is not abused. The negative side affects would include retention problems, loss of public support for the military, and employer indifference.

Readiness of USAR units and individuals will always be debated. This age old debate results from recognition of



limitations the RC must overcome during peacetime. These limitations include fiscal appropriations, distribution and modernization of equipment, manning levels, skill qualifications, training time, training facilities, and training levels.

Final recommendations include continued integration of AC and RC personnel at every opportunity (i.e., RASP, increased AC FTS); combined AC and RC training exercises; continued direct monitoring and assistance in resolving readiness problems (i.e. USAR Readiness Command); defining appropriate missions for USAR units; tailoring of USAR units for defined missions (smaller units with specialized missions); and constant monitoring of legislation and policies impacting on all of the above areas.



## **APPENDIX A**

### **CATEGORIES OF RESERVE PERSONNEL**

**RESERVE CATEGORIES:** READY RESERVE, STANDBY RESERVE, AND RETIRED RESERVE.

#### **READY RESERVE -**

**SELECTED RESERVE:** Units and individuals designated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as essential to wartime missions -

**Troop Program Units (TPU)** - soldiers assigned to Reserve Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). The soldiers normally perform 48 Inactive Duty Training (IADT) assemblies and 14 days of Annual Training (AT) per year.

**Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program (IMA)** - soldiers assigned to Active Component (AC) organizations, the Selective Service System, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency. These soldiers fill individual billets after mobilization. They perform 14 days of AT per year, normally with the AC unit of assignment.

**Active Guard Reserve Program (AGR)** - soldiers serving on active duty for 180 days or more for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training of the Reserves.

**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR):** soldiers assigned to one of the following Ready Reserve Control Groups - Annual Training (AT), Reinforcement (R), or Officer Active Duty (OAD). The IRR is a manpower pool of pre-trained individuals who have already service in AC or Selected Reserve and have a portion of their Military Service Obligation (MSO) remaining. IRR members are liable for involuntary active duty and fulfillment of mobilization requirements.



## **APPENDIX A (CON'T)**

### **CATEGORIES OF RESERVE PERSONNEL**

**INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD (ING):** National Guard soldiers who are in an inactive status. Members of the ING are attached to National Guard units but do not participate in training activities. Upon mobilization under the required authority, they would report to their unit of attachment. Members must also report annually.

**STANDBY RESERVE:** USAR soldiers who have completed all obligated or required service or have been removed from the Ready Reserve due to circumstances of civilian employment, temporary hardship, or disability. The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who can be mobilized if necessary.

**RETIRED RESERVE:** Comprised of all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retired pay on the basis of active duty and/or Reserve service. Also included are those Reserve Officer and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay but have not reached age 60, and who have not elected discharge and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve.



## **APPENDIX B**

### **LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION**

#### **PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP (PSRC):**

Authority - Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12304

The President has the authority to involuntarily call up 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve (from all services) for up to 270 days to meet any operational mission requirements. PSRC authority does not require the President to declare a national emergency but he shall report to Congress within 24 hours the reasons for this action.

#### **PARTIAL MOBILIZATION:**

Authority - Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12302

After the Presidential or Congressional Declaration of Emergency or a Congressional Declaration of War, the President may order up to 1,000,000 of the Ready Reserves (units and individual Reservists from all services) without their consent, for not more than 24 consecutive months. This authority grants access to the Individual Ready Reserve. Requires periodic Presidential reports to Congress regarding the reason for this action.

#### **FULL MOBILIZATION:**

Authority - Title 10 U.S.C. Section 12301

In the time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress may authorize the call-up of all forces, without their consent, in the current force structure, including the Army Reserve and National Guard units, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and members of the Retired Reserve, and the resources required for their support for the duration of the emergency plus 6 months.

#### **TOTAL MOBILIZATION:**

An extension of full mobilization by activating and organizing additional units beyond the current approved force structure. Total mobilization brings the industrial



## APPENDIX B (CON'T)

### LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

base up to full capacity to provide the additional resources, equipment and production facilities needed to support the armed forces of the nation.



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 1993, 1.

<sup>2</sup>Togo D. West, Jr., and Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1997, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Congressional Activities Division, 1996, 26-27.

<sup>3</sup>William F. Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen-Soldier: Legislative Policy-Making for the Federal Armed Forces Reserve, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1967, 15.

<sup>4</sup>John D. Stuckey and Joseph H. Pistorius, Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 15 November 1984, 10.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, 11.

<sup>6</sup>Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History of the USAR, 1908-1983, Washington, DC: Office, Chief Army Reserve, September 1983, 64.

<sup>7</sup>Stuckey and Pistorius, Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 12.

<sup>8</sup>Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen-Soldier, 15.

<sup>9</sup>Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 80.

<sup>10</sup>Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1987, 31.

<sup>11</sup>Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 94.

<sup>12</sup>Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War, 29.



<sup>13</sup>Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen-Soldier, 18.

<sup>14</sup>Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War, 28-38.

<sup>15</sup>Crossland and Curried, Twice the Citizen, 131-132.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, 100.

<sup>17</sup>\_\_\_\_\_. , The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, June 1996, 16-17.

<sup>18</sup>Crossland and Curried, Twice the Citizen, 116-120.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, 120-123.

<sup>20</sup>\_\_\_\_\_. , The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, 63-64.

<sup>21</sup>Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen-Soldier, 17-19.

<sup>22</sup>Crossland and Curried, Twice the Citizen, 133-135.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Stuckey and Pistorius, Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 25.

<sup>25</sup>Crossland and Curried, Twice the Citizen, 146-147.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Martin Binkin and William Kaufman, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1989, 49.

<sup>29</sup>Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords & Plowshares, (New York: Norton, 1972): 135-136, quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982, 15.



<sup>30</sup>Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 201-202.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid, 208.

<sup>32</sup>Binkin and Kaufman, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve, 56.

<sup>33</sup>Crossland and Curried, Twice the Citizen, 208.

<sup>34</sup>John Brinkershoff, et al, Reserve Volunteerism, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1996, Chapter 2, 3.

<sup>35</sup>Robert H. Scales, United States Army in the Gulf War: Certain Victory, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993, 18.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid, 42.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid, 136.

<sup>39</sup>John Brinkershoff, et al, Reserve Volunteerism, Chapter 2, 2-4.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid, 4.

<sup>41</sup>Michael Angelo, Office, Secretary of the Army, interview by author, 23 January 1997, Washington, DC.

<sup>42</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, America's Army Reserve: Engaged Worldwide in Peace While Prepared for War, Washington, DC: Office Chief Army Reserve, Tab E.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid,

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid, 4.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.



<sup>48</sup>Ibid, 7.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid, Tab A-iii.



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